American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

1984

The Continuing Diminished Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus
Review to Challenge State Court Judgments: Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Servies Agency
Ira P. Robbins
Susan M. Newell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons

THE CONTINUING DIMINISHED
AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW TO CHALLENGE
STATE COURT JUDGMENTS:
LEHMAN V L YCOMING COUNTY
CHILDREN'S SER VICES AGENCY
IRA
SUSAN

P. ROBBINS*
M.

NEWELL**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ....................................................
272
I. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children'sServices Agency: A
Decision in Search of a Holding ........................... 273
A. Background ..........................................
273
B. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ............... 275
1. Physical confinement as "custody" ................
276
2. Criminal conviction as "custody" ..................
278
3. Restraints on liberty as "custody" .................
279
C. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 .................. 281
D. Federalism and Finality .............................. 282
1. Federalism ........................................
283
2. Finality ...........................................
285
II. The Effect of Lehman on Federal Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction ...............................................
286
A. Pre-Lehman Child Custody Cases in the Federal Courts 286
B. Pre-Lehman Jurisdiction Under Federal Habeas Corpus 290
1. Federalism as a factor in denying pretrial habeas
corpus jurisdiction ................................. 290
* Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, The American University,
Washington College of Law. Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. University
of Pennsylvania, 1970; J.D. Harvard University, 1973.
** Associate, Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds, Dallas, Texas. Member, Texas Bar. B.S. University of Oklahoma, 1975; J.D. The American University, 1982.

272

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:271

2. Federal courts' interpretation of the scope of habeas
corpus relief under the "custody" requirement .....
a. The Hensley decision ...........................
b. The availability of habeas corpus depending on
actual physical custody by the state or on
severe restraints resulting from a criminal
conviction .....................................
c. The availability of habeas corpus depending on
restrictions on the petitioner's liberty of
m ovem ent .....................................
d. The availability of habeas corpus depending on
federal interest in liberty outweighing finality
concerns .......................................
of
Lehman on the Availability of a Federal
III. The Effect
Forum to Challenge the Constitutionality of Child Custody
Statutes ...................................................
A. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus .................
B. Other Means of Federal Review ......................
1. Suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................
a. State proceeding concluded ....................
b. State proceeding pending ......................
c. State proceeding not instituted .................
2. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court .......
Conclusion ......................................................

292
292

293

296

298

300
300
303
303
303
304
305
306
307

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, in a series of recent decisions, has indicated that
federal courts should rule conservatively on applications for writs of
habeas corpus.1 In one of those decisions, Lehman v. Lycoming County Chill. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982) (per curiam) (state prisoner must
fairly present substance of federal habeas corpus claim to state court before state remedies will be
deemed exhausted); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (applying cause-and-prejudice test of
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977), whereby state prisoner, barred by procedural default
from raising constitutional claim in habeas proceeding, may not litigate that claim without showing
cause for and actual prejudice from default); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982)
(requiring petitioners to satisfy Sykes cause-and-prejudice standard for federal convictions); Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) (district court must dismiss state prisoner's habeas petition that
contains both unexhausted and exhausted claims); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)
(failure to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim at state level is not exception to requirement
that petitioner exhaust all state remedies, despite clear violation); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,
547-49 (1981) (federal courts, in habeas corpus proceedings, must accord presumption of correctness
to state court findings of fact and explain any decision not to accept state court findings of fact).
The Supreme Court rearticulated the presumptive correctness standard after the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misapplied the standard on remand. Sumner v. Mata, 455
U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982) (per curiam).
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dren'r Services Agency, 2 the Court held that federal courts did not have
jurisdiction to entertain a writ of habeas corpus that challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that authorized termination of parental
rights.3 The rationale of the restrictive decision in Lehman could certainly have precedential value for limiting the use of habeas corpus,
which is often the only means of obtaining federal review of a case
brought by a state prisoner to protect his federal constitutional rights.
The opinion in Lehman is broadly worded, and the court's rationale is
evasive. Although the majority held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was lacking, the basis for that holding is not readily discernible
because the underlying facts provided a wide range of reasons for the
4
Court's refusal to grant the writ.
This Article first examines the Lehman opinion to determine why the
Court held that the lower federal court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a
writ of habeas corpus. Next, the Article considers the effect of the Lehman decision on habeas jurisdiction in terms of the federal courts' prior
interpretation of the scope of their habeas jurisdiction. Finally, the Article examines the effect of Lehman on the availability of a federal forum
to litigate federal rights in light of recent Supreme Court decisions that
have invoked the abstention doctrine and have narrowed plenary review
5
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I.

LEHMAN V LYCOMING CouNTY CHILDREN'S SERVICES AGENCY:
DECISION IN SEARCH OF A HOLDING

A.

A

Background

In 1971 Marjorie Lehman, who had never been married, became
pregnant with her fifth child. Her income at that time consisted solely
of a monthly supplemental security income allowance on which she supported herself and three of her four children. 6 Faced with the prospect
of having a fourth child in her care, Lehman voluntarily placed her
three sons with the Children's Services Agency. The Agency, in turn,
2.

458 U.S. 502 (1982).

3. Id at 516.
4. Indeed, the dissenting Justices agreed that the district court should have denied habeas
relief, but disagreed with the majority's reliance on the jurisdictional bar. The dissent would have

held that the federal district court could have withheld relief as a matter of discretion. See id at
516-26. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
6. Marjorie Lehman's three sons, ages seven, five, and one, lived with her, and a daughter,
age 12, lived with Lehman's parents. See In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 341-47, 383 A.2d 1228,
1237-40, cert denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Evidence indicated that the Lehman home was severely
substandard. A caseworker for the Children's Services Agency described the home as unfit for
habitation by children. Id at 341 n.14, 383 A.2d at 1237 n.14 (1978).
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placed the boys in foster homes. 7 Three years later, Lehman's request
that her sons be returned to her marked the beginning of more than
seven years of litigation.
Because the evidence developed by caseworkers and the Pennsylvania
judiciary painted a bleak picture of Lehman's ability to raise four children,8 the orphan's court terminated her parental rights, 9 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision.' 0 Lehman then filed a
third-party habeas corpus application" in federal district court under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 12 She sought a declaration that the state termination statute was unconstitutional, and asked that her sons be returned to
her custody. The district court dismissed the petition without a hearing,1 3 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.14 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether federal habeas corpus jurisdiction under
section 2254 may be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of a state
termination statute like the one at issue in Lehman. 15
7. While her sons were living in foster homes, Lehman visited them monthly at the Children's Services office. Id at 342, 383 A.2d at 1238.
8. Tests revealed that Lehman had an I.Q. of between 43 and 57 and a mental age of between 6 and 12 years. Id at 344, 383 A.2d at 1239. She was unable to keep track of money and to
perform simple tasks. Id at 342 n. 17, 344, 383 A.2d at 1238 n. 17, 1239. Moreover, her three sons
testified in chambers that they did not want to live with their mother. Id. at 343, 383 A.2d at 1239.
On this point, both the majority and the dissent ignored the affirmative testimony of the children
and simply noted that there was "no evidence that. . . the sons wanted to return to their mother."
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 504 n.2, 525 (1982).
9. In re William Lehman, Nos. 2986-88 (C.P. Lycoming County, Orphan's Ct. Div. June 3,
1976). On the basis of the evidence, the orphan's court concluded that, because of Lehman's very
limited social and intellectual development and her five-year separation from the children, she was
"incapable of providing minimal care, control and supervision for the three children." d. at 4.
10. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Lehman
had appealed the decision of the orphan's court to the state supreme court on the ground that the
termination statute was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. Id. at 329, 383 A.2d at
1231. The factual findings of the lower court were not contested. After reviewing the record from
the orphan's court proceedings, the state supreme court rejected Lehman's contention and upheld
the termination decision. Id at 359, 383 A.2d at 1247.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976); infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 2242).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976); see Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency,
458 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1982) (discussing facts of habeas application involved); nfa notes 20-57 and
accompanying text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).
13. The district court reasoned that the Lehman sons were not in custody within the meaning
of§ 2254(a), and therefore refused to grant habeas corpus relief. See Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 506 (1982).
14. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc). The court of appeals upheld the dismissal by a vote of six to four, with no majority opinion.
15. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 451 U.S. 982 (1981) (decision
granting certiorari). The statute at issue in Lehman authorizes, in pertinent part, termination of
parental rights when: "[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care . . . necessary for his . . .wellbeing. . . and the causes of incapacity. . . cannot be remedied by the parent." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 311(2) (Purdon 1977).

DIMINISHED FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

1984]

In reaching its decision to affirm the dismissal, 1 6 the Supreme Court
first examined the statutory requirements for habeas jurisdiction under7
section 2254(a), and held that those requirements had not been met.'
The Court then discussed the federalism and finality concerns that
weighed against granting habeas jurisdiction in a case such as Lehman's.18 The Court indicated that these concerns, along with several
aspects of the statutory language, supported a finding of lack of
jurisdiction.
Because the majority opinion in Lehman did not isolate one factor as
dispositive of the jurisdictional issue, the precise rationale underlying
the Court's decision is unclear. The conclusion that the federal court
had no jurisdiction to hear a petition for habeas corpus in a state parental rights termination proceeding could have resulted from the Court's
consideration of several factors. These factors include whether habeas
jurisdiction existed at all, 19 and whether federalism and finality concerns made the exercise of habeas jurisdiction inadvisable.
An examination of these factors will aid in an understanding of the
role that each played in the Court's deliberations, and will help to determine the precedential value that the Court's treatment of the factors
will have for future habeas corpus proceedings. In addition, a review of
previous law applicable to these factors will provide an analytical framework within which to assess the validity of the Court's reasoning.
B. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S C § 2254(a)

In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 usually governs jurisdiction.20 That statute, in part, allows a federal court to entertain an application for habeas corpus only if the petitioner is in custody
pursuant to a state court judgment, and only if that custody violates
federal law. 2 ' The petition for habeas corpus in the Lehman case was
based on alleged violations of federal constitutional rights, which rights
16,

Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 516 (1982).

17.

Id at 508-12; see infra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text (discussing statutory require-

ments for habeas jurisdiction).
18. Id
ity concerns
19. 28
§ 2254(a)).
20. See

at 512-14; see infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (analyzing federalism and finaladdressed by Court).
U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (1976); see infra note 20 (discussing § 2254) & 21 (text of
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).

Section 2254 grants federal district courts general subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See id § 2254(a)-().
21.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
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the Court did not address. 22 The failure of jurisdiction rested solely on
the conclusion that the petitioner was not in custody pursuant to a state
on the
court judgment. Indeed, the Court began its analysis by focusing
23
statutory language concerning custody and its meaning.
. Physical confinement as "custody"
First, the Court's holding in Lehman can be interpreted to mean that
habeas corpus relief is available only when the petitioner is in the actual
physical custody of the state after a criminal conviction. 2 4 The language
of section 2254(a), however, does not support this narrow interpretation.
The Court's reading of the language requires a number of limiting
phrases to be added to the statute: "a person in [the actualphysical] custody [of the state] pursuant to the [criminal] judgment of a State court
"25

To support its narrow reading, the Court emphasized that the word
"prisoner" appears in both sections 2241 and 2254(b) of title 28, which
apply to habeas corpus proceedings.2 6 The Court implied that "pris27
oner" meant one who is in actual confinement upon a criminal action.
The Court's narrow reading of the statute, however, is inconsistent with
Congress' choice of the words "custody" instead of "confinement," and
"judgment" instead of "conviction" in other sections of the statute. In
addition, the narrow definition of "prisoner" is inconsistent with the
Court's previous holdings that actual physical confinement is28not absolutely necessary to satisfy the statutory custody requirement.
In fact, the Court in Lehman recognized three cases in which it had
held that custody does not require actual physical confinement. First,
the Court discussedJones v. Cunningham,29 in which it had held that a
parolee is "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction because "the custody and control of the Parole Board involve significant
restraints on petitioner's liberty. . . which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the public generally. 30° The Court then referred to Carafas v. LaVallee, 3 1 in which it had held that the case of a
petitioner who had served his full term since he had filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus was not moot for purposes of habeas jurisdiction
22. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 505-07 (1982)
(petitioner claimed parental rights terminated pursuant to unconstitutional statute).
23. See id at 508-12.
24. Id
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976); see supra note 21 (text of § 2254(a)).
26. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 508-09 n.9 (1982).
27. See id at 510.
28. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
29. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
30. Id at 242.
31. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
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because he was subject to "collateral consequences" as a result of his
conviction. 32 Finally, the Court cited Hensky v. Munical Court.33 In
that case, the Court had reaffirmed theJones standard for defining custody, and had held that the petitioner, who had been released on his
own recognizance, was "in custody" because he was "subject to restraints 'not shared by the public generally.' -34 The Court found that
these holdings, however, did not dictate a finding of "custody" in Lehman, and explained that the previous cases limited the availability of
habeas corpus review to situations in which "as a result of a state-court
criminal conviction-a petitioner has suffered substantial restraints not
'35
shared by the public generally.
A distinction based solely on the criminal nature of the judgment,
however, is unwarranted: the Court had specifically held in two earlier
36
cases that habeas challenges to noncriminal judgments were proper.
Although it acknowledged these holdings, the Court attempted to distinguish them from Lehman by emphasizing that both earlier cases had
involved custody under federal-not state-judgments.3 7 Challenges to
a federal judgment, the Court reasoned, do not threaten interference
with state proceedings and therefore do not involve federalism concerns. 38 The Court thus implied that a more liberal construction of the
term "in custody" is allowed in reviewing challenges to federal, as opposed to state, judgments.
Varying the meaning of the term "in custody" to accommodate federalism concerns, however, is not a legitimate technique of statutory construction. The "in custody" language that appears in the portions of
section 224139 directed at federal petitioners also appears in section
2254(a) 40 relating to state petitioners. The word "prisoner" appears in
the introductory portion of subsection (c) of section 2241, 4 ' which
prefaces the statutory scheme for both federal and state petitioners. An
honest attempt at statutory construction, therefore, requires that the
terms "custody" and "prisoner" be interpreted identically in both
42
contexts.
32.
33.
34.

Id at 237; see infta notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
411 U.S. 345 (1973).
Id at 351 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).

35. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982) (emphasis added).
36. See Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972) (use of habeas to challenge Army reserve duty);
Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (use of habeas to challenge exclusion from
country).
37. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 508-09 n.9 (1982).

38, Id
39, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
40. Id § 2254(a).
41.
42.

Id § 2241(c).
Imaginative lawyers have argued without success that the definition of "custody" in the
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2. Criminalconviction as "custody"
In further distinguishing the case in Lehman from previous decisions
that would support a liberal reading of the availability of habeas relief,
the Court implied that a criminal conviction might be a necessary prerequisite for filing a writ of habeas corpus. The Court noted that the
Lehman children, unlike prior state habeas petitioners, were not prisoners and did not challenge a criminal judgment. 4 3 Next, the Court stated:
"Moreover, although the children have been placed in foster homes pur' 44
suant to an order of a Pennsylvania court, they are not [in custody]."
The Court's language makes possible the interpretation that a state
petitioner must be in actual or constructive custody pursuant to a criminal conviction before that petitioner could file a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court stated that the children's lack of prisoner status and the absence of a state criminal judgment alone distinguished Lehman from
cases that have upheld federal habeas relief from state court judgments. 45 In addition, the Court characterized the state court's action in
' 46
Lehman as "an order," and avoided the use of the word "judgment.
The word "judgment" contained in the habeas phrase "judgment of a
State court" could now conceivably be considered a term of art meaning
''a criminal conviction."
Despite the language that implies a requirement of a criminal convichabeas corpus context should be applied to cases that involve the use of the word "custody" in
other statutory contexts. The courts have refused to equate the terms in the context of a request for
credit for time served while the prisoner was released on bail or bond. See, e.g., Cerrella v.
Hanberry, 650 F.2d 606 (5th Cir.) (prisoner's bail, although restricting his travel, did not constitute
custody for which credit against sentence would be given), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034 (1981); United
States v. Hoskow, 460 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (time spent on release subject to bond conditions was not time spent in custody for purposes of sentence credit); Hogan v. United States, 383 F.
Supp. 850 (D.S.C. 1974) (prisoner not entitled to sentence credit while free on bond pending appeal
of conviction). A federal court was equally unpersuaded by a prisoner's argument that he should
receive credit against his ultimate sentence for time he spent incarcerated on a contempt citation.
Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). A defendant
released on his own recognizance has been held not to be in "custody" for purposes of Miranda
warnings. United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
One court, however, has used the Hensley definition of custody, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, to determine the point at which a person is in custody, and thereby to assess whether the
defendant had been denied a speedy trial. United States v. McDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.
1976), rev'don other grounds, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). In United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit also relied on Iensiey to support its finding that the petitioner, although he had been transferred by the Attorney General pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum, was in custody in the hands of federal authorities and therefore could be charged
with escape from custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 (a) (1976). Similarly, Hensley was cited in a
finding of custody for purposes of a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976) (failure to appear pursuant to court order), although the prisoner was on release on his own recognizance. United States v.
Garner, 478 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
43. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982).
44. Id (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. See id at 511 n.12, 514 (referring to state decision below as "an order").
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tion, however, the Court's remarks do not appear to rise to the level of a
holding. The most forceful indication that the Court does not, by its
decision in Lehman, limit habeas relief to criminal judgments is its reservation of the question of the availability of habeas when a child is in a
state institution rather than a foster home.4 7 Moreover, the mere fact
that the Court distinguished the facts in Lehman from those in prior state
court habeas challenges on the basis of the children's nonprisoner, noncriminal status falls far short of a statement that federal habeas relief is
limited to those instances.
3. Restraints on liber as "custody"
Another element of the Court's analysis of "custody" was its discussion of restraints on liberty. The Court specified that the children were
not in state custody. It did not address, however, the nature of the state's
involvement with the children. Instead, the Court compared restrictions
that the foster parents placed on the Lehman children with those restric48
tions that natural or adoptive parents impose on children.
Because the question is whether the children are in state custody, the
Court should have used the test developed inJones and Hensle-i.e., it
should have compared the restraints imposed by the state on the Lehman children with the restraints imposed on children generally. Even
more narrowly, the Court should have compared state restraints on foster children with state restraints on children generally, 49 for the state has
a continued significant presence in the lives of foster children that it
50
does not have in other children's lives.
In Lehman the state was involved in the Lehman children's recognized
constitutional liberty interests by virtue of the statute that permitted the
termination of Lehman's parental rights. 5' If the Court had compared

state involvement with the Lehman children to all restrictions on children generally, it might have found that children generally have limited
rights and that those who are entrusted with their care would exercise
the same decisional power as the state did pursuant to the Pennsylvania
statute. Parents generally decide, for example, where children will live,
47. Id at 511 n.12.
48. Id. at 510-11.
49. For the Court's discussion of state restraints versus general restraints on children, see id
This approach is consistent with that used by the Court in Jones: "the custody and control of the
Parole Board involve. . . restraints. . . which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon
the public generally." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963) (emphasis added).
50. The dissent pointed out that foster children are wards of the state: "the State decides
where they will live, reserves the right to move them to new physical settings at will, and consents to
their marriage, their enlistment in the armed forces, as well as all major decisions regarding medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment." Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency,
458 U.S, 502, 521 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. See supra note 15 (discussing parental rights termination standard in Lehman).
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and whether to move them to new physical settings. Although it is true
that the state placed greater restrictions on the Lehman children than it
places on children in general, the Lehman children did not suffer
greater actual restraint by virtue of the state's involvement. The state,
in a sense, merely substituted for the parent.
In its examination of whether the restraints placed on the Lehman
children constituted custody, however, the Court ignored the state's involvement, and looked only to the restraints that had been imposed by
the children's actual physical custodians, the foster parents.5 2 In so doing, the Court implied that because physical custody is required for use
of habeas, only restraints that the physical custodian imposes will be
examined. It also implied that the Court will consider restraints imposed by the state only when the state is the actual physical custodian.
Another explanation for the majority's approach is its apparent desire
to reduce the number of federal habeas corpus cases. 53 If the majority
had compared the state's restraints in the present case with restraints on
children generally and had found that the state's restraints were insufficient to find "custody," the door would still be open to habeas review of
child custody cases. Because state involvement with foster children varies from state to state, 54 petitioners could continue to bring habeas cases
in child custody matters by distinguishing between their state's restraints and the state restraints imposed in Lehman.
But the Court in reaffirming the Henst ey andJones standard of "custody"-restraints on liberty in excess of those imposed by the state on
others55-actually narrowed the definition of liberty for purposes of that
standard. The decision in Lehman supports the idea that a finding of
"custody" is required only when a person's freedom of movement is restricted or when he is confined.
The Court's reliance on Hensl and Jones for the proposition that
habeas relief is available only when liberty of movement is restricted is
misplaced. In neither case did the Court limit habeas relief to the particular restraints before it. The decision in Hensley, in fact, contains language that refutes such a narrow reading. The term "liberty," as used in
that case, encompassed rights in a broad constitutional sense. In Hensle
52. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982).
53. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing Court's recent efforts to limit habeas
review).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392.8 (McKinney 1983) (court may order protection by
setting forth reasonable conditions of behavior that person or agency before court must observe for
specified time); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 16501 (West 1983) (child protective services program can act
to protect child whose welfare is endangered by providing alternate care outside home, such as
foster care); TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 41.021 (Vernon 1980) (payments for protective care of
foster children must equal payments made for similar care of child eligible for department's aid to
families with dependent children).
55. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982)
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the Court held that the fact that the petitioner had to keep a stay in
force to remain out of prison was in itself an impairment of his liberty
56
significant enough to constitute custody.
The Court in Lehman identified physical confinement, criminal conviction, and restraints on liberty as the elements of custody necessary to
establish jurisdiction for federal courts to entertain a writ of habeas
corpus from a state proceeding. Because it did not hold that these three
elements are always required for any finding of custody in habeas cases,
however, the exact nature of "custody" that is required to satisfy section
57
2254(a), therefore, still is unclear.
C Jurisdidion Under 28 US. C

§ 2242

The habeas petition in the Lehman case was a third-party application
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242.58 Such petitions may be made only
when the signator acts on behalf of the one for whom relief is intended. 59
As such, the application in the Lehman case raised two questions. First,
on whose behalf did Lehman act? Second, for whom did she seek relief?.
If Lehman was acting in her own behalf and sought relief for her own
constitutional deprivations, the Court clearly lacked jurisdiction to hear
her claims under federal habeas corpus because she was not, and, of
60
course, never claimed to be, in custody as the statute requires.
In answering these questions the majority characterized the dispute as
being one between Lehman and the state, and found that Lehman
sought relief for herself rather than for her sons. 6 1 Based on this charac56. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 352 (1973).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). For the text of§ 2254(a), see supra note 21.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976). Section 2242 provides in pertinent part: "Application for a writ
of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended
or by someone acting in his behalf." Id
59. See id
60. See id § 2254(a). For the text of this provision, see supra note 21.
61. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982). The
Court, in a footnote, noted that Lehman's lawyer had stated that the hearing before the Pennsylvania trial court was not a custody proceeding. Id at 511 n.13. Although the Court did not
explain the significance of this statement, an inference arises that the Court believed that Lehman
was attempting to vindicate her own constitutional rights rather than to relieve her sons from the
custody of their foster parents. The dissent analyzed the question of the real party in interest under
the third-party application as calling for a discretionary determination ofwhether Lehman was the
"next friend" of her children. See Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 149 n.8 (1967) (per curiam)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (in habeas corpus proceedings "the practice of a next friend applying for a
writ is ancient and fully accepted") (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915,
916 (2d Cir. 1921)). It submitted that ample evidence existed for the district court, in its discretion,
to find that the petitioner had made an insufficient showing that she was acting in her children's
interest and therefore to refuse to grant relief. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Although the dissent's analysis is correct, its application of that analysis to the facts in Lehman is
incorrect because sufficient evidence existed to hold that Lehman not only did not represent the
interests of her children, but also that she sought, as the majority stated, to litigate her own interests
before the Court.
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terization, the Court could have found that because Lehman was before
it on a habeas petition without being "in custody," it could not, as a
matter of law, entertain the writ. There is nothing in the opinion, however, to suggest that the majority held that jurisdiction was lacking on
the ground that the third-party applicant was not in custody. A plausible explanation is that the majority included its discussion of Lehman's
petition as seeking relief from her own constitutional deprivations because some members of the majority would have denied jurisdiction on
that ground. Thus, the Court may have addressed the third-party application in the opinion in order to win the votes necessary to deny
jurisdiction.
D.

Federalism and Finality

In addition to the jurisdictional questions under the habeas statutes,
the Court in Lehman addressed the issues of federalism and finality that
child custody cases, in particular, raise. On the issue of federalism the
Court noted that the writ of habeas corpus represents "profound interference" with state judicial systems, and thus must be reserved for cases
in which the federal interest is exceptionally great. 62 The Court then
pointed out that the state's interest in finality is unusually strong in
child custody cases because of the child's need for a stable, secure environment. 63 The Court's analysis in each of these areas does not rise to
the level of a holding that these concerns bar jurisdiction, but does indicate that they should play a prominent role in any federal review of a
state proceeding under habeas corpus.
The Court's emphasis on federalism also suggests that it is proper to
apply a higher standard in determining "custody" when a state, rather
than a federal, petitioner seeks federal collateral review. The apparent
standard set by the Court for state petitioners seeking federal habeas
corpus relief is to balance the federal interest in individual liberty
against federalism and finality concerns. This standard purportedly
gives the federal courts wide latitude in denying federal habeas relief to
state petitioners simply by finding countervailing interests in federalism
and finality.
62. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 516 (1982). Federal habeas corpus alters the federal-state relationship by allowing a federal district judge to penetrate a judicial area normally reserved for state jurisdiction and to overrule the judgment of the
highest state court. Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111-12
(Ist Cir. 1978); see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52A (4th ed. 1983) (discussing doctrine
of "Our Federalism," which mandates federal judicial restraint from hearing constitutional challenges to state action where intervention is improper intrusion on state court right to enforce state
laws).
63. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982); see infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
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Federalsm

The Lehman Court emphasized that habeas corpus interferes with notions of federalism by giving a single federal judge the power to overrule
a state supreme court decision. 64 This interference weighed heavily
against the grant of habeas relief. According to the Court, the federal
interest in individual liberty in child custody cases is insufficient to warrant federal habeas intervention. 6 5 Furthermore, the parents' constitutional rights of due process and equal protection do not warrant federal
habeas relief in child custody cases because these issues are only collateral to child custody disputes. 66 The Court implied that these constitutional issues did not require federal habeas review because the rights
involved can be protected through the usual channels of appeal, certio67
rari, and litigation under the civil rights statute.
The Court's analysis of federalism in Lehman is faulty. First, the
Court overlooked the fact that Congress, by enacting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254,68 had decided that a federal district court judge should have the
power to nullify a state decision. Congress had demonstrated its sensitivity to the demands of federalism by the requirements that it imposed
on habeas petitions from state judgments, including the requirements of
exhaustion of state remedies, 69 deference to state findings of fact, 70 and
certificates of probable cause to appeal. 71 If Congress felt that the
power granted to a single federal district court judge was destructive to
federalism, it could have designated the federal appellate court rather
than the lower district court as the initial arbiter of habeas corpus writs.
The Court's emphasis on federalism concerns implies that preservation
of the dignity of a state's judicial system is more important than correcting the constitutional errors that result from wrongfully holding a
person in custody. Despite such federalism concerns, however, federal
courts, at both the trial and the appellate levels, retain the ultimate authority to resolve federal constitutional issues, and should not have to
defer to state courts in matters involving constitutional deprivations.
64. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1982).
65. Id at 515-16.
66. Id at 515. In stating that the constitutional issues in child custody cases are collateral to
the custody disputes, the Court cited Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584
F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978). Slv/ander had emphasized that states have a long history of predominance
in family law matters and strong substantive interests in the welfare of the children residing in the
state. Id at 1111. The federal government, on the other hand, has no equivalent substantive interest in child custody matters, and therefore its interest is collateral to custody disputes. Id
67. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 515 (1982)
(quoting Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir.
(1978))

68.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).

69,
70.
71.

Id. § 2254(b)-(c).
Id § 2254(d),
Id § 2253.
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Next, the Court's statement that the constitutional issues in these
cases are "collateral to" the custody decision is difficult to justify. The
petitioner in Lehman had challenged the constitutionality of the very
statute on which the state claimed its power to terminate parental
rights. It is difficult to imagine an issue more central to the state court's
ultimate decision than the constitutionality of the statute that gives rise
to the cause of action. The Court's conclusion that the federal interests
in Lehman were collateral to the child custody dispute is understandable
only because the Court viewed the constitutional issues in the case as
relating primarily to Lehman's rights rather than to her children's
rights.

72

After presenting its federalism concerns, the Court stated that the procedures of appeal, certiorari, and litigation under the civil rights statute
are more appropriate than habeas corpus for challenging state court decisions in child custody cases. 73 The third method of challenging state
decisions that the Court suggested-resort to the civil rights statutespresents problems. The use of a federal statute such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 198374 would probably have a more detrimental effect on federalism
than does habeas corpus, because the exhaustion of state remedies that is
required for habeas review is not necessary under section 1983. 5 The
express purpose for requiring exhaustion of state remedies under habeas
is to give the states the ability to correct their own errors 76 and to lessen
72. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982).
73. Id at 515 (quoting Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103,
1111 (1st Cir. 1978)).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981); seeinfra note 183 (text of § 1983).
75. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (per curiam) (according to
legislative history, exhaustion of state administrative remedies not prerequisite to § 1983 action);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974) (state prisoners may sue for damages under § 1983
based on due process violation prior to exhaustion of state remedies); Wilwording v. Swensen, 404
U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam) (state prisoners not required to exhaust state remedies prior to
making § 1983 claim); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (petitioner not required to
resort to state remedies before bringing § 1983 claim); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967) (one underlying purpose of Civil Rights Act is to supplement state remedies); McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963) ("relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated
because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy"); Monroe v.Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."). But cf Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (when prisoners challenge duration rather than conditions of confinement and request immediate or speedier release, sole federal remedy is writ of habeas corpus).
In a scathing dissent in Preiser, Justice Brennan highlighted the anomalous result that the majority
had created. See id at 502-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He found it difficult to distinguish between
prisoners who challenge the duration of their confinement and those who challenge the conditions
of confinement by bringing a § 1983 action as a means of circumventing the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus.
76. See Anderson v. Harless, 103 S.Ct. 276, 277 (1982) (per curiam) (exhaustion requirement
not satisifed unless substance of claim fairly presented to state court); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971) (exhaustion requirement designed to give states initial opportunity to correct violation of prisoner's federal rights). Courts consistently have adhered to the policy that "it would be
unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court convic-
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the effect of habeas on federalism.77 It is an anomaly, therefore, to speak
in terms of federalism and at the same time to note a preference for
section 1983 claims over federal habeas. Indeed, a section 1983 action
may be brought in federal court before the state courts have an opportunity to act on the issue, thus usurping the state's power to pass on federal
78
constitutional questions.
2

thiali,

The Lehman Court found that an exceptional need for finality exists in
child custody cases due to the state's interest in promoting a secure and
79
stable environment for the children who are involved in such disputes.
The Court's rationale for this finding, however, is unpersuasive. First,
the Court stated that habeas prolongs the uncertainty of whether the
child will remain in the care of his foster parents.8 0 In fact, habeas has
no such prolonging effect: until adoption, there is no certainty that any
child will remain in his foster home.8 1 Second, the Court noted that the
potential costs of continuing habeas litigation may deter states from
placing children in foster homes against the will of their natural parents.8 2 But this reasoning makes little sense in light of the Court's discussion emphasizing that states have an overpowering substantive
83
interest in these cases.
non without an opportunity for the state court to correct a constitutional violation." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
77. See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (respondent had not presented California
courts with constitutional question and thus had not exhausted state remedies as required by
habeas doctrine); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963) (exhaustion requirement reflects policy
of federal-state comity); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1959) (exhaustion doctrine evolved as
means of avoiding potential conflict between federal and state courts); Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114,
116-17 (1944) (denial of relief to petitioner grounded on principle that federal courts will interfere
in administration ofjustice in state courts only in rare cases); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27
(1939) ("the rule [of exhaustion] is not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate
exercise of power"); Er parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (purpose of exhaustion is to prevent
"unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution").
78. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974) (state prisoners may bring § 1983 action
for damages based on due process violation prior to exhaustion of state remedies); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal remedy is supplementary to state remedy; state remedy need not
be sought and refused before federal remedy is invoked); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513 (1982).
80. Id at 513-14.
81. See id at 521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, these concerns have already been
voiced in the analogous situation of convicts. Congress has expressed its concern for prisoners'
prolonged uncertainty regarding their incarceration by passing the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-8 (1982). The Act is designed to remove uncertainty by determining whether a person will face additional time in prison or jail. Removal of the uncertainty,
Congress believed, would increase the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs. See S. REP. No.
1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864, 4866.
82. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 514 n.18 (1982).
83. See id at 513. In Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103
(Ist
Cir. 1978), the court noted that states have a strong substantive interest in a child's welfare and
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Despite its emphasis on finality and federalism, the Court stated only
that federalism and finality concerns "argue strongly"8' 4 against granting a writ of habeas. This language represents at most a discretionary,
or prudential, bar, and is not the equivalent of an express holding that
finality and federalism interests are a complete jurisdictional bar to the
use of habeas in child custody cases. 85
II.

THE EFFECT OF LEHMAN ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
JURISDICTION

The effect on federal habeas jurisdiction of the Supreme Court's decision in Lehman will depend on the interpretation that federal courts give
to the decision. Under the decision, a federal court could deny habeas
corpus jurisdiction because the petitioner is not in the actual physical
custody of the state pursuant to a criminal judgment or because finality
and federalism concerns raise a jurisdictional bar. To determine which
interpretation federal courts will most likely give to Lehman and the subsequent effect that the decision will have on federal habeas jurisdiction,
an analysis of the federal circuits' previous treatment of each concern is
helpful.
A.

Pre-Lehman Child Custody Cases in the Federal Courts

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lehman, seven of the United
States courts of appeals had heard habeas corpus cases relating to child
custody matters. 86 Only two of the circuits had held that federal habeas
in parent-child relationships. Id at 1111-12. It is therefore "both more appropriate and more compassionate to leave the determination of custody to state tribunals .... Id at 1112.
84. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982).
85. In addressing the dissent's objection to the attention that the majority gave to finality and
federalism, the majority noted: "The dissent suggests that comity and federalism concerns cannot
inform a court's construction of a statute in determining a question of jurisdiction over certain kinds of
cases." Id. at 512 n.16 (emphasis added). This, along with the statement that federalism and finality concerns "argue strongly" against granting the writ, id at 512, suggests that the bar to habeas
relief was discretionary. The Court viewed the finality and federalism issues as factors that raised
prudential, rather than strictly jurisdictional, questions.
86. See Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1981) (habeas remedy unavailable in suit to determine custody between natural mother and adopted mother); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (custody of foster or adoptive parent
cannot be challenged through federal habeas corpus), aft'd, 458 U.S. 502 (1982); Davis v. Page, 640
F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (habeas petition by natural mother seeking return of child
committed to temporary custody of state), vacated and remandedsub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 458 U.S.
1118 (1982) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Lehman); Rowell v. Osterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1980) (natural mother seeking "release" of children from husband who prevailed in custody
proceeding); Syrovatka v. Erlich, 608 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979) (habeas corpus petition for custody
of minor children by parents accused of neglect), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, reh gdenied 448 U.S. 910
(1980); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978) (habeas petition for custody by
grandmother and uncle of Vietnamese children brought to United States and placed with foster
parents); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978)
(mother's habeas petition seeking return of child from childcare home); Tree Top v. Smith, 577
F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978) (natural mother seeking custody of child adopted by others); Nguyen Da
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review was proper, 7 but no circuit had held that the federal courts were
without jurisdiction in all child custody cases.8 8 For example, in the
Third Circuit decision in Lehman both plurality opinions indicated that
the third-party application by the parent whose parental rights had
been terminated was improper. The first plurality opinion would have
denied the writ because Lehman was attempting to use habeas to litigate her own right to raise the children. 89 The second plurality would
have denied the writ because Lehman was not a proper party to file the
application on the children's behalf.90
Decisions of other courts of appeals that had refused habeas jurisdiction in child custody cases reflect similar concerns. Both the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, for example, have indicated that federal courts should
not grant habeas jurisdiction in child custody cases on the grounds that
a petition brought by a parent is an improper third-party application, 9 1
Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (class action by "babylifted" Vietnamese children
asserting detention in United States in custody of persons other than their parents violated their
constitutional rights).
87. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted relief in two cases. In
Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chastain v.
Davis, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982) (remanded for reconsideration in light of Lehman), the court allowed
the writ to challenge a judgment that placed the child in the physical custody of a state agency.
The state did not dispute that the child was in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Id at
602. The court stated that, although domestic relations are usually a state concern, "nothing in the
history of the habeas writ suggests that it should be denied merely because the custody at issue
results from an adjudication involving child custody." Id The court's liberal view is best reflected
in an earlier decision. See Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The court
in Rowell granted habeas to determine custody between the parents, despite the petitioner's failure
to exhaust state remedies. Id at 438 n. 1. The court disposed of the jurisdictional question summarily: "Petitioner urges that her children are detained as the result of constitutionally defective procedures. For this wrong, habeas corpus constitutes the traditional remedy." Id at 438 n.l.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also granted the writ in one case.
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (habeas relief granted to review thirdparty application on behalf of Vietnamese child brought to United States under Operation
Babylift); see infra note 91 (discussion of Nguten Da Yen).
88. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, has criticized the
exercise ofjurisdiction so strongly that it has raised the equivalent of a jurisdictional bar. See Doe v.
Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 106 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981) (federal court may have technical jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 but does not have power to interfere in ongoing state proceeding).
89. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (per Garth, J.) (parent seeking to litigate own right to raise children, not liberty rights of
children), affd, 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
90. Id at 153-54 (Adams, J., concurring) (parent whose rights have been terminated is not
presumed to represent best interests of child and therefore is not proper applicant).
91. In Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1982), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had questioned whether parents whose parental rights had been terminated
had standing to bring a habeas petition on behalf of their child. Id at 535. The court also discussed the countervailing factors of federal-state comity and the availability of an adequate state
remedy and denied habeas relief. See id; see also Westerville v. Kalamazoo County Dep't of Social
Servs., 534 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (W.D. Mich.) (habeas improper means for parent to litigate right to
raise children), afdmem., 708 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit's position comports with
that of the Sixth Circuit. In Tree Top v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978), the court stated:
Under the circum"The crux of [the] petition relates to the merits of the custody disputes ....
stances, [the petitioner] is now bound by the state judgment and the federal courts will not entertain her complaint merely because she has refrained the custody dispute as a petition for habeas
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or that it appears inadvisable to the court to grant jurisdiction.9 2 The
position taken by the Eighth Circuit in a recent child custody case also
appears to indicate that the third-party application by the natural parent was improper. 93 Similarly, both the First and Fourth Circuits have
refused habeas jurisdiction when the child's interests would not be
served by granting the relief that the natural parent sought. 94 The First
Circuit, however, has noted that habeas review of child custody cases
would still be available under "proper circumstances," such as in situations in which a child is in a state home or is involved in a struggle for
his liberty. 95
This survey of cases from the United States courts of appeals illustrates that a child custody issue in and of itself does not present an absolute jurisdictional bar to habeas review. 96 In fact, those courts that have
addressed the "custody" issue seem to agree that the jurisdictional elecorpus." Id at 521. The court thus viewed the parent as an improper third-party applicant. See id
But f Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (third-party applicant is proper
party to seek habeas relief on behalf of children). In Ngayen Da Yen a third-party applicant who was
not the children's parent sought habeas relief for children who were erroneously believed to be
orphans and who had been brought to the United States as part of the Vietnamese orphan
"babylift." See id at 1196-97. The court found the third-party applicant to be a proper party to
represent the children's interests and granted habeas relief. See id at 1202-03. A primary factor
that made habeas relief appropriate, the court noted, was the federal government's extensive involvement in the operation. See id.
92. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 633-34 (6th Cir. 1978) (pending state adoption
proceedings and federalism are good reasons to defer to state proceedings and decline federal jurisdiction); see also Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531, 535-36 (6th Cir. 1982) (as discretionary matter
federal courts generally reluctant to entertain jurisdiction over "whole subject of domestic relations") (quoting Ohio ex re.Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930)).
93. See Syrovatka v. Erlich, 608 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, reh ' denied,
448 U.S. 910 (1980). The court focused on whether habeas served the child's interests, noting that
this remained the paramount concern. See id at 310. The two children in Syrotatka had been
adopted 11 years before the proceedings and were 15 and 17 years old at the time of federal appellate review. Id at 311. The court found that removing the children from their adoptive parents
would not serve the children's best interests, and therefore denied habeas. Id at 310. The parents
alleged that they had inadequate notice of the state proceedings and the court agreed that the
notice did not appear to meet due process standards. The state statute, however, provided a conclusive presumption that the termination proceedings were valid if they were not challenged within
two years. The court held, alternatively, that the opportunity to challenge the proceedings was no
longer available on the basis of the state statute, which was designed to further the legitimate state
interest of ensuring a stable environment for the children. Id at 310.
94. See Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 1981) (habeas relief not available in light of
child's best interests); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1113
(1st Cir. 1978) (federal habeas corpus relief that could undermine child's interest not available to
challenge state child custody ruling).
95. See Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1113 (1st Cir.
1978). The child involved in the Sylvander case was in a children's home and not in foster care, but
the home was a private, rather than a state, institution. The district court denied habeas relief
based on this distinction, and specifically found that, although the child was "in custody," there
was no state involvement because of the private nature of the institution. See Sylvander v. New
England Home for Little Wanderers, 444 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Mass.), afd, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir.
1978).
96. The courts have reserved the question ofjurisdiction for a case that presents a special need
for habeas review. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1981) (federal habeas corpus
may be available in presence of special circumstances); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little
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ment of "custody" was met. 97 The Supreme Court's nebulous holding
in Lehman, however, did little to clarify the issue. If the Court in Lehman
held that children placed in foster homes are not "in custody," then
there can be no jurisdiction to entertain a writ of habeas corpus. This
would be true even if a third party acting on behalf of the child sought
habeas and if it was in the child's best interest to reverse the state judgment that terminated parental rights. On the other hand, Lehman could
be read to have held that there was no jurisdiction because the interests
raised were chiefly those of the mother, who was not "incustody" as
required for habeas jurisdiction. Under this interpretation, jurisdiction
would fail whenever the interest of the state and the child in a federal
court's declining to review a case under habeas outweighed the federal
interest in the child's liberty. Although these interpretations lead to different lines of reasoning, the result-denial of jurisdiction-would be
the same in both cases.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that the distinction matters in practice. It would be only in the "unique" case 98 that a state would terminate parental rights when the child's interest indicated that they should
not be terminated. If the underlying facts of the initial state decision did
not support the decision, it is unlikely that the situation would reach the
stage at which habeas review is needed. Absent a "powerful countervailing [state] interest," 99 a parent's constitutional right to the custody
Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1113 (lst Cir. 1978) (court does not hold that children and those acting
for them may not seek writ under proper circumstances).
97. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (habeas jurisdiction sustained on ground that child involved was held pursuant to state court judgment), vacated and remandedsub nom, Chastain v. Davis, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982); Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437, 438 (5th
Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction to entertain habeas petition claiming children detained by constitutionally
defective procedures); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975) (federal
habeas jurisdiction available where federal government was involved in child custody issue). But see
Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 1982) (habeas may be proper remedy for parents
to regain custody of children, but, due to comity principles, it is limited to cases involving severe
restraints on individual liberty); Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1981) (federal habeas
jurisdiction unavailable in suit between private parties over custody of child); Westerville v.
Kalamazoo County Dep't of Social Servs., 534 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (W.D. Mich.) (although habeas
jurisdiction may arguably exist under statute, child's best interest warranted adherence to strong
federal policy of deferral to state courts on custody matters), afl'd, 708 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1982);
Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 444 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D. Mass.) (child's
adoption without petitioner-mother's consent does not place child in state custody for purposes of
habeas jurisdiction), afd 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978).
98. See, eg., Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (habeas available to
Vietnamese children erroneously believed to be orphans and therefore mistakenly brought to
United States). For a discussion of Nguyen Da Yen, see supra note 91.
99. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1974) (custody rights of both parents
equally protected and secondary only to "powerful countervailing interest") (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972) (statute that
presumes unwed father unfit as parent and automatically terminates his custody rights does not
further state's countervailing interest in child's welfare); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
766 (1982) (countervailing government interest includes parens patriae interest in preserving and
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of his child remains protected. 0 0 A state decision that falls short of this
"countervailing interest" standard surely would be corrected either
within the state system, or by appeal or certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
B.
I

Pre-Lehman Jursdiction Under FederalHabeas Corpus

Federalism as afactor in denying pretrialhabeas corpusjurisdiction

Although the Supreme Court has upheld the use of habeas corpus
prior to trial, 10 1 notions of comity and federalism have led federal courts
to decline to entertain pretrial habeas applications when, even though
the jurisdictional elements of the habeas statutes are present, "special
circumstances" that would require pretrial review are not. 0 2 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example,
has refused to entertain a pretrial application even though the petitioner
had alleged that a trial would result in a violation of his fifth amendment right to be free from double jeopardy. 10 3 Although some circuits
have granted the writ before trial under a claim of double jeopardy, at
least where the alleged unconstitutional proceeding would be a second
trial, 104 the Seventh Circuit found that the principles of federalism reflected in Younger v. Harris10 5 were weightier than a double jeopardy violation in this case: the petitioner had not been subjected to a trial in the
first instance but had only pleaded guilty.'0 6 Other courts also have
promoting welfare of child and administrative interest in reducing cost and burden of such
proceedings).
100. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (natural parents have fundamental
liberty interest in care, custody, and management of child) (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
101. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968).
102. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), the Supreme Court
established that, absent special circumstances, "[flederal habeas corpus does not lie.., to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction
by a state court." Id. at 489.
103. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit Court, 675 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1982) (petitioner
convicted without trial on guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges faced trial on felony charges for
same offense).
104. See, e.g., Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.) (retrial on murder charge that could
expose petitioner to sentence under newly enacted death penalty statute), cert. dented, 442 U.S. 924
(1979); Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1979) (retrial in which judicial misconduct led
defendant to move for mistrial).
105. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court in Younger cited federalism as the primary source of the
policy against federal interference in state court proceedings. Id at 44. The concept of federalism
represents "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both the State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, [although] anxious. . . to vindicate and protect federal rights and. . . interests, always endeavors to do so [without] unduly [interfering] with the legitimate activities of the States." Id
106. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit Court, 675 F.2d 946, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1982). The
court reasoned that, because the petitioner had pleaded guilty on the first charges, the relief he
sought, in effect, was not release from custody but the injunction of his state criminal trial. Although the relief was "within the broad remedial powers granted federal judges by [habeas]," the
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cited Younger as authority for denying pretrial habeas relief.10 7
The application of the abstention doctrine of Younger, a case that involved a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,108 is inappropriate in many federal habeas cases. The Court abstained in Younger
because a proceeding was pending in which the claim could be raised at
trial or could be appealed within the state system.' 0 9 Because state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to determine federal constitutional questions, the Younger abstention doctrine demands
deference to the state system in which the claim has arisen when the
federal plaintiff already has a forum in which to raise his claims." 0
Application of this deference in cases brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983, however, cannot be extended to federal habeas cases because the
legislative concerns underlying section 1983 differ significantly from
those supporting the federal habeas statutes. Congress has distinguished
habeas from other actions, and has made it clear that holding a person
in custody in violation of federal law is intolerable. For example, although a federal court has express authority to stay state court proceedings in a pending habeas action,"'I in other civil or criminal proceedings
federal courts, with few exceptions, are expressly prohibited from enjoining pending state proceedings. 1 2 Federal courts, therefore, should
not readily abstain in pretrial habeas cases in reliance on a section 1983
decision. If their willingness to defer to the state courts and deny pretrial habeas on the authority of Younger is any indication, however, federal courts after Lehman are likely to expand their denials of habeas to
situations other than pretrial habeas.
court noted that it was "remote from the original purpose" of the writ--"release from unlawful

incarceration." Id at 947.
107.

See, e.g., Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1977) (Younger applicable when

granting writ is equivalent to enjoining state trial); Davis v. Muellar, 481 F. Supp. 888, 891-92
(DN.D. 1979) (Younger applicable when claim did not involve special circumstances such as speedy
trial or double jeopardy concerns), afd, 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).

108.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 198 1); see infra notes 183-97 and accompanying text (discussing

§ 1983).
109.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971).

110. See supra note 105 (discussing abstention doctrine).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pend-

ing, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending appeal,
stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under the

authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) provides in full:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
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2. Federalcourts' interpretationof the scope of habeas corpus reliefunder the
"custody" requirement
a.

The Hensley decizion

Prior to the decision in Lehman, the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Municipal Court 13 had found that the use of federal habeas corpus "has been
limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies
for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate." 1 14 Under this seemingly high standard, the Court concluded
that a petitioner released on his own recognizance was "in custody" for
purposes of habeas relief, because he was "subject to restraints 'not
shared by the public generally.' "115 The petitioner in Hensley was required, under a statute applicable to his postconviction release, to appear when ordered at any time and place, l t6 and to keep in force a stay
on the execution of his sentence in order to avoid incarceration. 117 The
Court found these obligations to be a substantial impairment of the petitioner's liberty.1 18
The Court, however, did not limit its analysis to a discussion of restraints alone. Also of importance to the Court was the petitioner's actual conviction and the previous exhaustion of his state appellate and
collateral remedies. 119 Unless the federal court overturned the petitioner's conviction pursuant to his habeas action, the petitioner would
be placed behind bars. 120 The Court's action, therefore, did not clearly
affect federalism interests because the petitioner had already proceeded
21
through the state system.'
The Hensley Court's discussion of the nonspeculative nature of the future incarceration, coupled with its statement that a contrary decision
would merely have postponed relief, could be read as indicating that
these were the decisive factors that caused the Court to find the restraints "severe and immediate" and convinced it to grant relief. 122 Because of the Court's emphasis on the petitioner's proximity to actual
113. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
114. Id at 351. The extraordinary nature of the writ, the Court noted, has limited its use to
cases of special urgency where the prisoner, for example, is subject to restraints not shared by the
general public, see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963), or where his freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers. See Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
115. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (quotingJones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 240 (1963)).
116. Id (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318.4(a), (c)).
117. Id at 352.
118. Id
119. Id at 346.
120. Id at 351-52.
121. Id at 352-53.
122. See United States v. Consiglio, 391 F. Supp. 564 (D. Conn. 1975). Following Henslqy, the
court held that "the imminence of incarceration is a sufficient basis for the exercise of habeas corpus
jurisdiction." I1d at 566 n.2.
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imprisonment, the absence of imminent incarceration arguably could distinguish any future case from Hensley.
The holding in Hensley could also be limited in application because of
the physical restraints that the petitioner suffered. The Court emphasized that the particular restraints in the case affected the petitioner's
23
"freedom of movement" and his ability to "come and go" as he chose.1
Thus restraints that affect liberty interests other than freedom of movement could be distinguished, 124 as could a statute, for example, that required the defendant's appearance at a given place and at a specified
25
time.'
Finally, the Court's statement as to when habeas is appropriate purports to set a high standard, limiting habeas relief to "cases of special
urgency."' 26 Recitation of that standard, without guidance from the
Court's finding of "custody" under the facts of Hensley, could allow
lower courts to withhold habeas relief relatively easily by finding that
the petitioner is not "in custody."
Although the decision in Hensley contains language that supports a
liberal interpretation of the "custody" requirement, its holding may be
read as a narrow one. 127 A review of the reading that lower federal
courts have given Hensley will give insight into the validity of the Court's
attempts in Lehman to limit the application of the Hensley decision.
b.

The availabilityof habeas corpus depending on actualphysical custody
by the state or on severe restraintsresultingfrom a criminal
conviction

Federal courts could construe the Court's decision in Lehman to re28
quire actual custody or physical restraints after a criminal conviction.'
Although the lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's
decisions injones 129 and Hensl, 130 some lower court decisions contain
123.

Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).

124. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing restraints on liberty as basis for
finding custody).
125. But see Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 354 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Hensley argued that, to the contrary, Hensley was "under no greater restriction than

one who had been subpoenaed to testify in court as a witness." Id
126.

See upra text accompanying note 114.

127.

See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348 (1973) ("The question presented for

our decision is a narrow one. . . ."); see also Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir.)

("Despite the broad sweeping language of the Supreme Court's opinions, each decision's holding is
narrow."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979).
128. See supra notes 16-57 and accompanying text (discussing possible interpretations of custody requirement in Lehman).
129. FollowingJones lower courts have held that petitioners released on parole are "in custody"

for purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute. See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697,
698-99 (W.D. Mass. 1976); United States ex re Petillo v. New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1155-56

(D.NJ. 1975), vacated without opinion, 541 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1976); Haefeli v. Chernoff, 394 F. Supp.
1079, 1080 n.3 (D. Mass.), rev'don other grounds, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975).
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language that the Court in Lehman could have cited to support its limitation of the applicability of Hensley and Jones to cases involving actual
physical restraints.13 1 Pre-Lehman "custody" cases, however, also show
that the lack of physical custody or of a criminal conviction has not
played a limiting role in habeas relief.
Although the vast majority of the cases that cited Hensley involved
criminal proceedings, courts have relied on Hensley in noncriminal cases
as well. "Custody" has been found, for example, where the petitioner
had been detained for military court-martial, 13 2 and where the peti133
tioner had been detained or ordered deported as an illegal alien.
Such cases, of course, would be unaltered even if Lehman had held that a
criminal conviction was necessary for federal habeas review of a state
petitioner's application: the petitioners in those cases were subject tofederal rather than state judgments.
Habeas corpus has been granted, however, in cases that involved state
noncriminal judgments. In one case, a petitioner who had been adjudged in need of supervision and had been confined to a state training
34
school was held to be "in custody" for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.
In another case, a petitioner who was free on bond pursuant to a material witness statute was found to be "in custody" even though there was
135
neither physical custody nor a criminal proceeding.
130. Courts have consistently cited Hensley in finding that petitioners released on their own
recognizance pending appeal are "in custody." See, e.g., Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427, 429
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982); Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 573 (1st Cir. 1980);
United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1169 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974), aid sub nor
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Turoso v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 531 F. Supp. 829,
830 (N.D. Ohio 1980), afd, 674 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1982), cer. denied 103 S. Ct. 177 (1983), Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 n.2 (D. Conn. 1976), aI'd, 559 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Sedgwick v. Superior Court, 417 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D.D.C. 1976). ret,W
on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); Garrison v. Smith,
413 F. Supp. 747, 751 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624, 627-28 (S.D. Ohio
1975); United States v. Consiglio, 391 F. Supp. 564, 566 n.2 (D. Conn. 1975).
131. See Westerville v. Kalamazoo County Dep't of Social Servs., 534 F. Supp. 1088, 1097
(W.D. Mich.) ("Hense , . . . andjones . . . concerned extensions of the writ to persons criminally
accused who had an obvious claim to be treated for federal jurisdictional purposes in the same
manner as those individuals who were incarcerated."), afd mem., 708 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1982);
Fleming v. Abrams, 522 F. Supp. 1203, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (" 'First there must be some sort of
supervisory control over the person of the petitioner.... Second, the existence of an imminent
possibility of incarceration without a formal trial and criminal conviction may create such a restraint on liberty as to constitute custody.' ") (quoting Whorley v. Brilhart, 359 F. Supp. 539, 542
(E.D. Va. 1973)), af'd, 697 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1982).
132. See Reed v. Middendorf, 383 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
133. United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director of INS, 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.), ert.
denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y.),afdrrevantpart 684
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
134. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afdin rlevantpart, 502 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The petitioner had challenged the constitutionality of a statute that authorized detention at the training school, and had been released on parole
at the time of habeas review. Id at 490.
135. In re Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977).
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In the criminal area, courts have often granted habeas relief pending
a conviction under the challenged action. 136 Habeas has been granted
when a petitioner who was under indictment but had been released on
bond raised a speedy trial claim; 137 when a petitioner challenged the
ability of state officials to remove him from a hospital pursuant to a
bench warrant; 138 when a parole violator detainer had been lodged;1 39
when a petitioner was released on bond pending extradition proceedings; 140 and when petitioners were released on bail or on their own recognizance pending retrial.141
Federal courts have also granted relief after a conviction when no restraint of any kind had been imposed at the time the petition was
filed. 142 An order to surrender after conviction, for example, has been
held sufficient for a finding of "custody" although the petitioner had not
yet surrendered. 4 3 Similarly, the filing of the petition before a postconviction warrant had issued was found not to be fatal to the court's jurisdiction. 144 The same liberal construction underlay the grant of relief
when the petitioner was released on his own recognizance, apparently
136. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing criminal cases granting pretrial
habeas relief). But see supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing denial of pretrial
habeas).
137. See United States ex re. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 293 (2d Cir. 1976) (petitioner released prior to trial on bail and later on parole was subject to burdensome restraints constituting custody).
138. See Roba v. United States, 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979). In Roba the petitioner's presentment before a magistrate was interrupted when his medical condition required that he be taken to
a hospital for emergency treatment. A removal warrant was executed and the petitioner sought a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he had a right not to be transported forcibly by government
officials while he was in a life-threatening condition. Id at 217-18. The court held that, if the
removal warrant was executed petitioner would be in custody, and therefore he was in custody for
habeas purposes even while he was in the hospital. Id at 219.
139. See Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D.D.C. 1974) (detainers lodged against
parolees incarcerated for offenses committed subsequent to release on parole constitute restraints
tantamount to custody).
140. See Campbell v. Shapp, 385 F. Supp. 305, 306-07 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (release on bond pending extradition proceedings constituted custody for purposes of habeas jurisdiction), affd without
opinion, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976).
141. See, e.g., Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir.) (defendant released on own
recognizance but not yet convicted was in custody), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Delk v. Atkinson, 498 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (bail pending trial considered custody for purposes
of statutory habeas requirement), af'd in relevantpart, 665 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1981); United States ex
rt Triano v. Superior Court, 393 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (D.NJ.) (defendant released on own recognizance pending retrial and sentence considered in custody for habeas jurisdiction purposes), affd
without opinion, 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976).
142. See, e.g., Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d 115, 117 (7th Cir. 1979) (where habeas corpus filed
while petitioner was confined, jurisdiction not defeated by subsequent release); Capetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1238, 1239 (5th Cir. 1969) (habeas petition not moot merely because petitioner
was no longer in custody, as long as custody existed when petition was filed); Gowen v. Wilkerson,
364 F. Supp, 1043, 1044 ('A.D. Va. 1973) (petitioner out on bond pending outcome of habeas
application to court considered theoretically in custody).
143. See United States ex re. Horelick v. Criminal Court, 366 F. Supp. 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
rev 'don other ground , 507 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1974).
144. See Bates v. Estelle, 483 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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without the usual parole restrictions, after having served a substantial
part of the sentence that he was appealing. 145 In addition, "custody"
was found where a petitioner's probation, the result of a suspended sentence, had been stayed pending appeal. 146 Finally, a petitioner on fur47
lough from prison has been held to be "in custody."'
Despite these liberal interpretations of "custody," however, attempts
to extend Hensly to allow habeas review where there were no present or
imminent restraints have failed. The courts have held that a petitioner
may not challenge a conviction on the sole basis of the collateral conse48
quences flowing from a conviction. '
These cases demonstrate that the lower federal courts have not read
Hensley in the narrow way that the Supreme Court suggested in Lehman.
The courts have not found that their jurisdiction is limited to criminal
cases or to habeas cases brought only after conviction, and physical custody has not been required. Indeed, cases have been heard in which
neither physical custody nor criminal processes were involved. If Lehman is interpreted to require one or both of these elements, a drastic, but
probably not unintended, change in the law will result.
c.

The availability of habeas corpus depending on restrictions on the
petitioner's liberty of movement

The Supreme Court's opinion in Lehman appears to limit the "in custody" requirement of habeas jurisdiction to cases in which restrictions
have been placed on the petitioner's freedom of movement.'

49

The

Court distinguished Hensley because of the type of liberty-freedom of
movement-that was restrained in that case. An examination of lower
court cases in which liberty interests other than freedom of movement
were affected by the challenged judgment will help to determine how
courts have treated the nature of the liberty interests in granting or denying the writ.
145. See Glucksman v. Birns, 398 F. Supp. 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
146. Willin v. Ajello, 496 F. Supp. 804 (D. Conn. 1980), afl'd without opinion, 652 F.2d 55 (2d
Cir. 1981).
147. See United States ex rel.
Geisler v. Walters, 510 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1975).
148. See, e.g., Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1976) (petitioner's inability
to pursue profession of choice and possess firearms not custody within meaning of habeas); Welch v.
Falke, 507 F. Supp. 264, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (conviction that renders petitioner ineligible for
record expungement does not satisfy custody requirement for habeas relief); Brewster v. Secretary
of United States Army, 489 F. Supp. 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (possible damage to reputation arising
from conviction and lack of physical confinement not sufficient to constitute custody). But see Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1979) (although service on challenged conviction was completed, postponement of second sentence until first sentence was completed held to prolong custody
for habeas purposes); Glover v. North Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C. 1969) (collateral consequences sufficient for finding of custody for habeas jurisdiction).
149. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussing Court's treatment of restraints on
liberty in Lehman).
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Imposition of a fine is a recognized restraint on personal liberty interests.15° Nonetheless, without incarceration or probation the courts generally agree that the petitioner who is subject to the imposition of a fine
is not "in custody" for purposes of habeas jurisdiction.' 51 Once the imposition of a fine contains some element of physical restraint, however,
the courts have recognized that the "in custody" requirement may be
met. Jurisdiction lies, therefore, when a warrant has been issued for the
petitioner's arrest due to his failure to pay the fine. 152 Similarly, when
payment of the fine is the "price of freedom" courts have held that the
153
jurisdictional prerequisites for habeas have been satisfied.
Although the courts seem to acknowledge that the consequences that
flow from a past conviction do infringe on personal liberty, 5 4 the lack of
physical confinement or of continuing supervisory control renders the
past conviction an "[in]sufficient disability to constitute 'custody.' ,,155
Supervision alone, however, without actual restriction of the petitioner's
freedom of movement, has been held in some cases to be sufficient to
150. In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Court stated that deprivation
of property is a significant restraint on personal liberty. Id at 552. Imposition of a fine, then, like
any other deprivation of property, represents a restraint on liberty.
151. See, e.g., Waste Management of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 140 (7th Cir.) (corporation, which could not be incarcerated, was not in custody despite imposition of fine), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1060 (1980); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir.) (fine-only conviction
was not sufficient restraint on individual liberty), cert denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Wright v. Bailey,
544 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1976) (fine alone without provision for incarceration in event of nonpayment was not "in custody"), cert denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791,
792 (8th Cir.) (fine alone not significant restraint and thus custody requirement not met), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.) (Congress did
not intend federal intervention in fine-only sentences), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Westberry v.
Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1970) (imposition of fine and revocation of driver's license do not
constitute "in custody"); Furey v. Hyland, 395 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (D.N.J. 1975) (absent incarceration or other recognized restraint, one is not in custody), a ifdme., 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976). But
see Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (dicta stating that relief can be
granted if plaintiff meets burden of proof), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
152. See Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.) (habeas appropriate when
fine is "price of freedom" and confinement is imminent), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Harris v.
Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1126 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974) (probation conditioned on payment of fine
constitutes custody), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); United States ex re. Lawrence v. Woods, 432
F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970) (no discussion of fulfillment of custody requirement when refusal to pay
fine resulted in actual incarceration), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971). But see Spring v. Caldwell,
692 F.2d 994,999 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'g 516 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (arrest warrant issued for
willful refusal to pay fine does not amount to custody).
153. Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.) (noting that habeas may be
justified when fine ultimately proves to be "price of freedom"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
154. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1967) (collateral consequences of past
conviction include restraints on petitioner's rights to engage in business, vote in state election, serve
as juror, and serve as official in labor union); Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir.)
(petitioner unable to pursue certain professions and possess firearms because of conviction), cert.
dented, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Welch v. Falke, 507 F. Supp. 264, 265 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (restraints on
liberty flowing from prior conviction preclude petitioner's ability to choose occupation).
155. Brewster v. Secretary of United States Army, 489 F. Supp. 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see
supra note 148.
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constitute "custody."156

Other "liberty" interests affected by a judgment also have been held
to be outside the "custody" requirement. The potential harm to the
practice of a particular career, 57 as well as the loss of pension benefits
and employment,1 58 does not constitute "custody." Nor is the petitioner
"in custody" when he may not drive on state highways for ten years. 159
These cases initially appear to indicate that the Court in Lehman gave
a restrictive reading of "liberty" that would not constitute a major
change in the law. Such a reading, however, does threaten a major
change because it would result in an absolute jurisdictional bar if the
petitioner's freedom of movement was not restricted. This result would
deny courts the discretion and flexibility to consider under habeas
corpus the validity of judgments whose resulting restraints might severely infringe on other liberty interests, but which do not directly limit
the petitioner's freedom to "come and go.' 60 Such a requirement
might resurrect procedural barriers and consequently could undercut
the courts' ability to use the habeas writ with the "initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are
61
surfaced and corrected."'
d

The availability of habeas corpus depending on federal interest in
liberty outweighingfinality concerns

The Court in Lehman purported to state a "custody" standard that
requires that the federal interest in individual liberty outweigh federalism and finality concerns.' 62 Whether and in what manner that test will
be applied outside the child custody area remains to be seen. The facts
156. See, e.g., Droltinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir. 1977) (petitioner under
probation conditions requiring approval to change job, to change living arrangements, to receive
gifts, and requiring him to make restitution from wages, held to be in custody); United States v.
McDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1976) (petitioner who was relieved of duties, placed
under surveillance, and escorted when outside quarters, and whose telephone calls were logged by
policeman, held to be in custody), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
157. See, e.g., Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (conviction
dented, 426 U.S.
precluding petitioner from holding certain jobs under state law not custody), cert.
911 (1976); Ostrer v. Aronwald, 434 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y.) (potential harm to legal career not
custody), afd, 567 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977); Furey v. Hyland, 395 F. Supp. 1356 (D.NJ. 1975)
(revocation of medical license not custody), affdmem., 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976).
158. See, e.g., Fleming v. Abrams, 522 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (loss of pension and employment as police officer not custody), afdmem., 697 F.2d 290 (1982).
159. See Whorley v. Brilhart, 359 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Va. 1973) (both supervisory control and
imminent incarceration needed for custody).
160. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); see supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text (discussing Hensley decision).
161.
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1973) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394
U.S. 286, 291 (1969)). The Court in Hensley emphasized that it has always recognized the importance of the flexibility of habeas corpus as a remedy to ensure justice. Id at 350.
162. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 516 (1982).
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presented in some lower federal cases inspire conjecture that the Lehman
standard could potentially support the denial of habeas jurisdiction.
In Hensley the Court held that a petitioner who had been released
pending execution of his sentence was "incustody" for habeas purposes.' 6 3 That holding might be different under the Lehman standard if,
for example, the petitioner's sentence had been that he spend four hours
in jail. 16 4 Similarly, in Jones the Court held that a parolee is "in custody."' 65 The result, again, might be different under the Lehman standard if the petitioner had filed his application on the last day of his
parole. 6 6 It is conceivable in both situations that the "federal interest
in individual liberty" would not be sufficient under the Court's test to
warrant habeas relief. Line drawing when the federal interest in individual liberty would be sufficient under such a standard surely would
lead to confusion among the lower courts.
Consideration might differ, too, if the petitioner received a suspended
sentence instead of probation. Even under the standards set by Hensley
and Jones, courts do not appear to be assured that the "custody" requirement is met.' 67 In the absence of restrictions usually associated
with parole or probation, there might be no federal interest in the petitioner's liberty.
Indeed, an analysis under a strict construction of the custody requirement stated in Lehman raises significant questions about the presence of
a federal interest in liberty in several circumstances. For example, is a
federal interest in liberty implicated in the case of a petitioner who, although he was on parole, had been determined to be subject to deportation and had, in fact, been ordered to report to the Immigration
Service; 168 in the case of a petitioner whose sentence had been commuted 69 or who had been pardoned" 70 prior to habeas review; in the
case of a petitioner who was on parole under both a challenged and an
163. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-53 (1973).
164. See Iglesias-Delgado v. Rivera-Rivera, 430 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1976) (custody implicitly
existed when sentence was four hours in jail).

165. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
166. See United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976) (custody found when habeas
petition was filed on last day of parole).
167. Compare Scarborough v. Kellum, 386 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (incarceration
for driving while intoxicated viewed as custody), aftd, 525 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1976) with United
States ex ref. Wojtycha v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1975) (suspended sentence not custody) and United States ex ref. De Rosa v. Superior Court, 379 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.J. 1974)

(questioning by police in non-,Miranda situation that was basis of indictment not custody).
168. Huante v. Craven, 500 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1974) (relief denied because ties with state
were too attenuated after petitioner had been delivered for deportation).
169. United States ex re.Grundset v. Franzen, 675 F.2d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 1982) (habeas jurisdiction not defeated by commutation of sentence where collateral consequences of conviction are
subject to district court relief).
170. Robson v. United States, 526 F.2d 1145, 1147 (1st Cir. 1975) (termination of petitioner's
custody by pardon did not moot action to review constitutional validity of criminal conviction).
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unchallenged conviction; 17 1 or in the case of a petitioner who, while
serving in the military, absented himself repeatedly without
72
permission?
Whether these kinds of cases would be resolved differently under the
Lehman test is not known. The Court's suggestion that courts "weigh"
the federal interest in liberty, however, is dangerous: it requires the
placement of a quantitative value on personal liberty. This concept
contradicts the underlying purposes of federal habeas review. If the writ
is to survive at all, review must be had once a restraint is found to be
"severe and immediate." 73
III.

THE EFFECT OF LEHMAN ON THE AVAILABILITY OF A FEDERAL
FORUM TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CHILD CUSTODY STATUTES

A.

Petitionfor a Writ of Habeas Corpus

The availability of habeas review in child custody circumstances that
differ from the Lehman case will depend on the grounds that are relied
on for the jurisdictional bar. If the Court determined only that the parent was an improper third-party applicant, the defect could easily be
remedied. Similarly, if the child's interests were seriously threatened,
perhaps the federal interest in individual liberty would be strong
enough that notions of finality and federalism, which essentially look to
the child's interests anyway, would be overcome. It is unlikely, however,
that parental rights would be terminated if the child's interests did lie
on the other side-that is, with his parents. If the Court had found that
restraints placed on children after termination of parental rights,
whether imposed by the state, by a private home, or by foster parents,
simply did not exceed those placed on other children or that they were
not restraints on the proper kind of "liberty," habeas jurisdiction in
these child custody cases would appear not to exist. The Court in Lehman, however, held that a child in a private foster home was not "in
custody" for purposes of habeas jurisdiction, and the Court left open the
possibility of granting habeas relief if, instead, the child were in a state
home.
If the child were in a state home, a writ of habeas corpus arguably
could be used to test the constitutionality of the termination statute. On
the other hand, if the state placed the child in a private foster home
171. Clonce v. Presley, 640 F.2d 271, 273 (10th Cir. 1981) (parole considered custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction).
172. United States ex re. Bailey v. United States Commanding Officer, 496 F.2d 324 (1st Cir.
1974) (custody found but relief denied on theory analogous to clean hands doctrine).
173. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
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before a petition was filed Lehman would apply, and the Court would
not have jurisdiction. Presumably, in every termination case the child is
a physical ward of the state for the period between his removal from his
parent's home and his placement in a private foster home. To avoid the
strictures of Lehman the petition must be filed within that period, because only then would the child be in custody.
The first obvious problem is that the state may place the child in a
foster home prior to the institution of termination proceedings. A delay
in filing the petition, therefore, would foreclose federal habeas review.
On the other hand, filing immediately presents problems of its own.
First, the challenge would not be to the termination statute because the
child would not be "in custody" pursuant to that statute. The challenge
instead would rest on the constitutionality of any judicial decision that
initially removed the child from the parental home.' 74 In a case like
Lehman, such a challenge would be a futile gesture: Lehman had placed
her children with the Agency voluntarily and the children were in foster
homes before termination proceedings began.
Second, state remedies usually must be exhausted before a party can
resort to habeas relief. 1 75 If the court demands exhaustion of state remedies before it will entertain the writ, the petitioner should request that
the court retain jurisdiction 176 while the petitioner pursues the state
174. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (state court termination of parental
rights held constitutional as supported by clear and convincing evidence); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702
F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1983) (custody rights of parents not absolute and terminable by court if
justified by compelling public necessity); Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1017 (2d Cir. 1982)
(court recognized instances of parental neglect or physical abuse mandating state intervention to
protect child's best interest); In re J.A., 283 N.W.2d 83, 92 (N.D. 1979) (juvenile court decision to
terminate parental rights upheld as supported by clear and convincing evidence).
175. In spite of the congressional requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, courts do not
consider it a jurisdictional prerequisite. The doctrine "is not one defining power but one which
relates to the appropriate exercise of power." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939); see Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963); Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200, 204 (1950); Erpare Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). Thus, courts may excuse the failure
to exhaust in some situations, such as when state remedies are unavailable, see, e.g., Noia, 372 U.S. at
399, or ineffective. See, e.g., Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963); Marino v. Ragen, 332
U.S. 561, 569-70 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). A current controversy that is likely to have some
important bearing on the question of the jurisdictional nature of the exhaustion requirement concerns whether the state can waive or concede exhaustion. Compare, e.g., McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d
1206 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (permitting state to waive); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495
(1 th Cir. 1983) (permitting state to waive); andJenkins v. Fitzberger, 440 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1971)
(permitting state to waive) with Bowen v. Tennessee, 698 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (denying waiver); United States ex ret. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1977) (denying waiver),
cert denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); and Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1969) (denying
waiver), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969).
176. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 348 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (jurisdiction should
be retained pending construction of state statute to avoid foreclosing access to federal courts to
assert federal rights); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1941) (ordering
federal court to abstain but to "retain the bill pending a determination of proceedings. . . in the
state court"). In Kravitz v. Pennsylvania, 546 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1977), the court denied habeas
relief and dismissed petitioner's case because he had failed to pursue his state remedies fully. By the
time the petitioner returned to federal court after exhaustion of his state remedies, however, he had
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remedies in case the state places the child in a foster home during that
period. 177 The petition then would have been filed while the children
were "in custody" and thus the private placement would not defeat federal jurisdiction. The same tactic could be used if termination proceedings were begun while the child remained under state control; the
petition should be filed immediately. Although the federal court would
decline to grant relief until the termination proceeding ended, it might
retain jurisdiction over the petition during that time.
If the court retained jurisdiction, another obstacle to habeas review
arises under the decision in Lehman. If the state placed the child in foster
care after the writ was filed, so that the child was no longer "in custody," the case might be moot. The Court in Carafas v. LaVallee 178 held
that, although the petitioner was no longer "in custody" at the time of
habeas review, his case was not moot because he suffered "collateral consequences" as a result of his conviction sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.' 79 This argument, however, may be foreclosed in child custody
cases. The Lehman Court tersely addressed this issue, and noted that the
children suffered "no 'collateral consequences'--like those in Carafassufficient to outweigh the need for finality."' 80 The Court's statement,
although arguably only dicta, could nevertheless present substantial
problems for a habeas petitioner.' 8 ' Finally, another mootness problem
arises in child custody cases. Even if the federal court retains jurisdiction pending the outcome of the termination proceedings and exhausbeen released from parole and the court, therefore, denied habeas a second time because he was no
longer "in custody." The court attempted to justify the harsh result by noting that the petitioner
had not attempted to have the federal court retain jurisdiction pending further state proceedings,
id at 1102-03, thus implying that such a request would have been appropriate and cognizable. Id
at 1102-03.
177. The petitioner could seek to enjoin the state from placing the child in a foster home, but a
court acting in equity is not likely to issue the injunction if the placement seems to be in the child's
best interest.
178. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
179. Id. at 237-38.
180. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc), vacatedand remanded sub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982), that a child
custody dispute was not moot even when the agency had returned the child to the parent at the
time of review. Id at 600. The court reasoned that the child remained under the agency's supervision because agency personnel visited the home regularly, the home had to be kept open to inspection by the agency, and the agency exercised some authority over parental decisions. Id.at 602.
The decision was remanded, however, to be reconsidered in light of Lehman. Id at 605.
181. Among the "collateral consequences" cited by the Court in Carafas were the petitioner's
inability to engage in business, his inability to vote, and the disabilities or burdens that might flow
from his conviction. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); see also supra note 154
(discussing cases that deal with collateral consequences). The Court in Lehman noted that, unlike
the petitioner in Carafas, the petitioner in Lehman suffered no collateral consequences, but the Court
did not articulate exactly how the petitioner in Lehman fell short of the Carafas standard. SteLehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982). Future habeas petitioners, therefore, might encounter more ambiguous, and potentially more severe, criteria in
attempting to satisfy the collateral consequences that are necessary for habeas corpus relief.
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tion of the state remedies, and even if it is convinced that Carafas applies
in spite of Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, the case may be moot if
82
the child has reached thus age of majority.
The Lehman decision thus raises formidable obstacles to habeas corpus
relief. The state may be able to moot a case under a timely habeas
petition merely by placing a child in a private or foster home. An extensive delay in the exhaustion of state remedies or in federal appellate
proceedings on habeas review could itself moot the case if the child is
older.
.

Other Means of FederalReview

A Suit under 42 US C § 1983
The constitutionality of a state statute may be challenged in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.183 The state action that removes a child
from the parental home or terminates parental rights can be challenged
in the first instance, at least in principle, by suit in a federal court under
section 1983. Bringing such a suit, however, has its problems. Whether
the federal court will exercise plenary review of the issues will depend on
the posture of the state's actions at the time the section 1983 suit is
brought-i.e., whether the state proceeding had concluded, was still
pending, or had not been instituted.
a. State proceeding concluded
Institution of a section 1983 suit or action after state proceedings have
been concluded may be fatal to the federal suit. If the constitutional
challenge to the state statute on which the decision rests was litigated in
the state court, the federal plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue in federal court.' 84 If, on the other hand, the state
court action was defended only on the facts and if the petitioner alleges
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied, the federal plaintiff may
litigate the issue in federal court. In that situation no estoppel exists,
because the constitutionality of the state court's application has not
been litigated. The federal plaintiff, of course, must not have appealed
the court's determination within the state court system on that
182.

The Court in Lehman stated that the case was moot with respect to the oldest son, who was

18, because he was free to seek adoption by anyone, including his natural mother. See Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 504 n.3 (1982). The Court's reasoning,
however, is weak. Obviously, the child would not have to seek adoption by his natural mother if

the judgment terminating her parental rights was set aside.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any right. . . secured by the

Constitution.
184.

.

. shall be liable to the party injured ....

See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (collateral estoppel prevented relitigation

of search and seizure issue already decided in state courts).
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ground. 18 5
Failure to raise the constitutional issues in the state proceeding

presents three problems. First, the party is forced into dual litigation,
state and federal, with all its concomitant delays and costs. Second, if
the party alleges that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, and had
failed to raise that issue in the state court, the state is certain to raise a
waiver argument to defeat the party's federal suit.18 6 Finally, the state
court may raise and decide constitutional issues on its own motion. If
the court does raise the constitutional issues sua sponte, it remains un-

clear whether a party's involuntary litigation of those issues in the state
187
court estops him from litigating those issues anew in the federal court.
b.

State proceedingpending

Institution of the section 1983 suit after the state proceeding has begun will not provide relief from the state proceeding, 188 and the federal

plaintiff will not receive plenary review until the state proceeding ends.
The federal court will abstain and dismiss the federal action until resolu-

tion of the pending state proceeding. 189 If state proceedings are instituted after federal suit has been filed but before proceedings of substance
on the merits have been undertaken by the federal court, the federal
court again will abstain.19° Before returning to federal court the plain185. Exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required in order to bring a § 1983 action. See
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (per curiam) (based on legislative history of
§ 1983, state remedies need not be exhausted prior to bringing § 1983 claim); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal remedy is supplementary to state remedies); supra note 75 and accompanying text (§ 1983 action or suit supplementary to state actions).
186. See infia note 191 and accompanying text.
187. The Supreme Court has held that, when a federal court abstains pending a determination
by a state court, the federal plaintiff may relitigate federal questions already decided by the state
court "unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily . . . litigated his federal claims in the state
courts." England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964) (emphasis
added). Whether the same would hold true if a plaintiff sought a federal forum only after the state
decision had been rendered is unclear.
188. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). As a general rule, a federal court may
not enjoin a pending state proceeding except under limited circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976) (court may not grant injunction to stay state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments"). Although § 1983 has been expressly recognized as an exception to § 2283, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), the equitable doctrine that the Court employed in Younger
has substantially the same prohibitory effect as § 2283. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)
(Younger precludes federal interference with pending state child custody actions); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Younger precludes federal interference with state action to recover
wrongfully received welfare payments).
189. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (state criminal proceeding may not be enjoined); see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (Younger applicable in pending child custody
action); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 633 (6th Cir. 1978) (fact that adoption proceedings
were pending in state courts was factor where court abstained in child custody case).
190. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (denial of injunctive relief by federal
court not sufficient substantive action by federal court to outweigh abstention once state action was
begun).
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tiff must conclude the state proceedings.
If federal jurisdiction is retained, the petitioner must inform the state
court of his federal claims so that the state court may act with those
claims in mind,' 9' but he may explicitly reserve his federal issues for
adjudication in the federal court.' 92 Voluntary litigation of the federal
issues in state court after federal abstention, however, would preclude
federal review.'

93

c. State proceeding not instituted
Filing a section 1983 suit or action before the proceedings begin raises
problems that do not appear when the state action is still pending or has
concluded. First, the statute may be challenged only on its face. Because the state proceeding would not have begun, the statute could not
be challenged "as applied": no application of the statute would have
been made to the facts of the case. Second, the federal plaintiff must
94
satisfy a host of jurisdictional prerequisites.1
Initially, the plaintiff must have standing-a sufficient stake in the
outcome of the case.1 5 Because the challenged statute operates directly
on the parents, this element is met. 96 The next, and more difficult,
jurisdictional problem to overcome is the demonstration that a case and
controversy exist, making the suit ripe for adjudication. To overcome
191. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420 (1964)
(party must notify state court, but need not litigate issues there).
192. Id at 422 n.13. In Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103
(1st Cir. 1978), the court expressly noted that the petitioner could have reserved her federal claims
while in the state courts but that, because she had failed to do so, her § 1983 suit was barred. Id at
1108 n.8.
193. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964) (party
who voluntarily submits federal claims for state court adjudication foregoes right to return to district court).
194. There are two jurisdictional prerequisites for asserting a claim under § 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has
been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Se Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980). Second, the deprivation must have
occurred "under color of state law." See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (involvement of policeman, regardless of whether actions were authorized, provided necessary state action
for § 1983 claim); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 187 (1961) (misuse of power, made possible
only because wrongdoer was clothed with authority of state law, is action "under color of state law"
pursuant to § 1983), overmrdin parton othergrounds, Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
195. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (plaintiff must assert distinct and palpable
injury to himself to establish standing);see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (injury
must be "real and immediate," not "abstract"); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (standing
requires specific present objective harm or threat of specific future harm).
196. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (physicians have standing to challenge
constitutionality of state abortion law because statute operates directly against them); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (farmers have standing to challenge Food and Agricultural Act of
1965 because Act affects them directly); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970) (petitioner has standing to challenge ruling by Comptroller of Currency as
violative of National Bank Act because petitioner's economic interest is within scope of statute).
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this hurdle, the plaintiff must show that his fears that the statute will be
applied to him are not "imaginary or speculative."'197 There must be
some showing, therefore, that the state is likely to institute parental termination proceedings. If suit is filed to challenge the termination statute after the children have been removed from the parental home, the
plaintiff has a strong argument that state termination proceedings are
no longer merely a "speculative" possibility.
2. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court
A parent may challenge the constitutionality of state termination statutes by direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court after full litigation of the question through the state court system.198 Appellate
review may be had even if the petitioner questions the constitutionality
of the statute as applied rather than on its face.19 9 Unlike review on a
petition for certiorari, review on appeal is obligatory. 2°° The Court
need not, however, grant plenary review. It may dismiss for want of a
substantial federal question2 0 ' or for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 20 2 Both courses of action are tantamount to summary disposition of the claim. Moreover, due to principles of res judi20 3
cata the decision by the Court on appeal forecloses habeas review.
Despite the procedural limitations on the obtainment of Supreme
Court review, however, parents may still challenge state termination decisions by direct appeal to the Supreme Court.2 04 In Santosky v.
Kramer,205 for example, decided just three months prior to Lehman, the
Court reviewed the question of the burden of proof that the state must
meet in a proceeding to declare a child permanently neglected.20 6 The
Court's language in that decision clearly indicates its position that re20 7
view is favored in this area as long as it is sought by proper means.
197. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976) (authorizing Supreme Court review by appeal if constitutionality of state statute upheld by state court).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 79 n.2 (1969) (appeal authorized where
statute is alleged to be unconstitutional as applied to particular class of cases); Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921) (review allowed when statute not claimed
invalid in entirety, but as applied to particular set of facts).
200. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
201. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (dismissal due to lack of substantial federal
question at time writ filed).
202. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
203. See Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 505 n.5 (1982).
204. See, e.g., In re John A.A., 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1980), vacatedon other groundssub
noma.Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
205. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
206. See id. at 761-66 (preponderance standard does not allocate risk of error fairly between
state and natural parents).
207. The Court in Santosky stated that "persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention
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CONCLUSION

The decision in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children'sServices Agency has
no direct effect on the availability of a federal forum to litigate the constitutionality of child custody statutes by means of a section 1983 suit or
action, or by direct Supreme Court review. Despite the Court's strong
indication that the suit in Lehman was improper, the Court's concerns do
not appear to extend directly beyond the habeas corpus context.
With respect to the issue of habeas jurisdiction, on the other hand,
Lehman may represent a significant change in the law. The effect of the
decision will depend on how the lower federal courts interpret the
Supreme Court's opinion. Although the Court found that the language
of the habeas statutes in combination with federalism and finality concerns supported a finding of lack ofjurisdiction, it did not expressly hold
that any single factor was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. In discussing the custody requirement under the habeas statutes, the Court
identified physical confinement, criminal conviction, and restraints on
liberty as elements that might constitute custody, but it did not specify
which combination of these elements might be required to establish custody under the statutes. Because notions of federalism and finality also
contributed significantly to the Court's decision to decline habeas jurisdiction, it is difficult to identify exactly what agreement the Justices did
reach. The Supreme Court's decision in Lehman, therefore, is a decision
in search of a holding. Its only unifying theme is the continued diminution, if not evisceration, of access to the federal courts on habeas corpus
by persons who are adversely affected by state court judgments.

into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id at 753-54.

